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I. A Prolonged and Anemic Recovery
The Japanese economy of 1996 is going to
register a growth rate well over three per cent,
after the three successive years near-zero
growth. However, this does not imply that the
economy will be on the track of three per cent
growth from now on.
The process of economic recovery has been
weak in all the way since the bottom of 1994.
The first half of 1995 was hit by the great
earthquake in Kobe and then by the "abnor-
mal" appreciation of the yen rate. In the latter
half of the year, when the yen/dollar rate
came back to the range of 100-110, business
mind regained its original pace of recovery.
In view of the anemic recovery of the econ-
omy and the need of help to shattered Kobe
district, the fiscal spending was boosted in the
latter half of 1995 and it continued to the first
half of 1996. Government capital formation in
1996 is likely to record a two digit rate of ex-
pansion.
Unemployment rate has peaked out after
April when it registered a historical high
(3.5% in April) due to the emerging new
graduates still seeking jobs. But employment
of new graduates has been steadily increasing
since April; firms are revising employment plan
upwards.
When we look to 1997, there appears an issue
of tax raise; the present 3% consumption tax is
going to be raised to 5% as of April 1st. The
recent General Election (October 20, 1996)
gave LDP a majority. It was a little short of
absolute majority, but the present cooperation
among three parties is likely to continue.
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Lately the new Hashimoto cabinet, which is a
LDP-led (non-coalition) government for the
first time since the beginning of 1994, made it
clear that (1) the tax raise of 5% in Spring of
1997 is c rtain, and (2) there would be no addi-
tional ad-hoc revision of the 1996-Budget and
(3) from 1997 on the government will address
to reducing budget deficit which has already
exceeded 4% line (over GDP). This means
that a quarter-to-quarter pattern of public
sp nding is a sharp decline from the second
quar er of 1996.
corpora e firms a e still in the process of ad-
jus ments o surplus capacityO ; the industrial
electronics sector, that is almost free from this
problem, has been leading the recovery of busi-
ness investment. However, a cutback of in-
vestment in s miconductor production capacity
will soften the overall pace of investment re-
covery.
All information fitted together, 1997 is likely
to be a year f slow growth-in the rage of
1.4% to 1.6%.
II. A Bleeding Recovery - Aftermath of
financial bubble
There is a significant "leakage" of flow from
th  income-expenditure cycle of the economy.
That is a leakage through the present scheme of
writing off bad debt by financial institutions.
The present amount of bad debt of the all bank-
ing insti utions (around 35 trillion yen, offi-
daily) will be written off with three more years
if hey put all the current operating surplus into
write-off and spend additionally a certain
amount (14%)of their capital gam accumu-
lated on their long-held stocks.
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But this simulation overlooks the fact that
the procedure presumes that the five trillion
yen would-be income of private savers is liter-
ally "confiscated" by the present low interest
policy. Would be amount of interest income
to be paid out to saver is added to banks'oper-
atmg surplus and it is "dumped into gutter"
In addition to this, all the banking institutions
will refrain from the would-be spending expen-
diture from operating surplus (such as invest-
ment into computer networks and bonus pay-
ments to employees etc.).　These factors
would add up to a large drop of domestic ex-
penditure, more than one percent of current
GDP, hence suppressing the actual growth rate
of the aggregate demand well below the poten-
tial growth path.
Massive Waste of Savings at the Front-gate of
Aging Society
The financial boom (or Bubble) produced
inexpensive capital for non-financial firms.
The small part of surplus fund went abroad.
But, most part of was financed to the domestic
financial and real estate development sectors.
Annual Report of National Income shows that
the amount of loss in market value of land and
other immovable assets add up to more than
five hundred trillion yen -equivalent of 1994
GDP.
Most part of bad debt was produced from
unrecoverable loans to real estate developers
whose value of collateral dropped sharply.
Land price is still falling as of March 1996.
Particularly, land value for commercial use in
downtown district f big cities are falling at a
rate of 15% or so.
For he household sector, net worth has not
grow  at all since 1989. Net asset ratio over
personal disposable income has even declined.
As a result, Japanese household faces a neces-
sity of rais ng saving ratio to make up for the
loss. This point is relevant when we discuss
the future tre d of yen rate in relation to the
capital acco nt in the balance of payments.
IH. Over-employment Situation-Why
umemployment rate is so low?
In the last b om period of 1987-90, employ-
ment expanded together with business invest-
ment. After the boom, there came up a threat-
ening employment crisis for the mid-
die-aged, a generation of baby-boomers of
Japan(born 1947 to 1950). With the end of
high growth and the anticipated progress of
"silver society", the highly-paid generation is
now out of balance m the corporate finance.
With r spect  the blue-collar workers at
factory level, res ructuring had started much
earlier in the first half of the eighties. The
middle managers at headquarters office of ma-
jor corporations were a new target of restruc-
tunng. Including the present author, many
economists predicted the coming of hard times
for white-col ar middle-aged. The strong im-
p vement of office work productivity in the
US bec me a new model.　Office machine
1) According to my own calculation, manufacturing industries as a whole have not yet finished adjustment of surplus productive
capacity. The investment boom of 1987・90 was led by auto industry and consumer electronics, let alone by real estate develop-
ers. As of the beginning of 1996, there should be not less than of4% of surplus real capital stock in the manufacturing indus-
tries. Capital goods, however, have become more malleable recently. Readjustment of surplus stock of equipment is being
conducted more flexibly than before. Yet there should remain the impact of over-capacity in the industries in general.
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(word-processing and data-processing as well
as information transmission) revolution would
enhance the pace of labor discharge. A pre-
vailing view among labor economists was that
unemployment rate of 4% or even 5% should
not be surprising. The actual unemployment
rate, however, came up around three and half.
It is a historical high, but well below our pre-
diction. All sorts of enquetes to corporate
firms turned out an unanimous outcome that
the majority of firms are suffering from over-
employment specifically among white-collars.
But there has happened no massive layoffs.
And unemployment rate has begun to lower
again. There was ajump in the rate in April
due to the new graduates who are seeking jobs.
From May and on, firms began to add new re-
cruits.
What have happened in the past five years of
recession? What have Japanese companies done
about their overemployment situation.　A
common pattern of firms'behavior facing over-
employed is:
1) suppress new recruits and wait for natural
decrease by retirement;
2) shift employees to subsidiaries (with low
pays but jobs are secured)
3) expand number of subsidiaries by means
of creating venture business,
4) take advantage of a government subsidy
program that encourages a restraint from
"free discharge" of laborO.
5) finally and more positively, shift to a new
field of product and redistribute employ-
ees.
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Somehow, the threatening over-employment
situation seems to have been overcome by the
gradual but steady adjustments by firms. I
ca not tell which one out of the above-
mentioned measures has really worked. In the
manufacturing s c or, the number of regular
workers declined by 2.7% from 1990 to 1995
and part-time and other non-regular workers
increased. In service sector, number of em-
pl yees increased significantly ( two and half
millio  jobs wer  created during the same pe-
riod).
Much criticized long-term employment sys-
tem of Japan seems to have generally survived
and the notion of job security for public re-
mamed tro among corporate management.
IV. Changes in the Role of Import and
Export
Exports have been the leading sector for the
recovery phase in the past business cycle of Ja-
pan, but this role has diminished recently.
Needless to s y, the appreciation of the yen rate
and the general propagation of the practice of
"voluntary export restraint" on finished goods
export is a major factor. In the field of
ntermedicate goods trade, a considerable part
of its export has become a part of productive
p ratio  by the US and other globalized firms.
Major p rt o  Japan's export is occupied by
capital goods and intermediate goods which are
indispensable for overseas productive operation,
hinting at the emerging intra-industry division
of labor. In summary, Japan's export has be-
come inelastic with respect to price change ow-
2) The program is only applicable to specified "depressed sectors.
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ing to the above-mentioned two factors.
Price Destruction
The picture of Japan's imports, on the other
hand, is quite different; price elasticity of lm-
port demand by Japanese consumers and pro-
ducers has become elastic. This is due to a
crumbling long-run relations among consum-
ers, producers, and subcontractors. The high
yen rate produced ample opportunity for busi-
ness firms who import from overseas. Strong
market force was the reason why Japanese par-
ent companies in automotive industry, for in-
stance, began to import auto-parts from the US
instead of purchasing them from domestic sub-
contractors, a part of "long-run customers.
The high yen rate made overseas production
more profitable for Japanese manufacturers;
import from "overseas subsidiary companies"
in Malaysia, China and Thailand have in-
creased enormously.
A surprising jump of the yen rate in the
Spring of 1995 continued to the end of Sum-
mer. It was a final push for the destruction of
Japan's closed business relations through mar-
ket force. The extraordinary high yen rate
was temporary, and the yen rate came back to
a more normal rate of 100 to 110 in the Fall3'.
However, the opened-up import market and
loosened "long-term business relationships" are
to remain. Consumers are now accustomed to
a wide range of choice of imported goods in
chain-stores. Import of manufactured goods
increased by 44% in terms of dollar value in
the five year period of 1990-1995.
Th  big ncrease in manufactured imports
si ce 1994 is only explainable by the combina-
tion of ncreased price-elasticity of imports and
structural hanges. Japan is currently main-
taining an unusual import-growth, in spite of
the stagnating economy. It is partly a reason
why GDP grow h rate has been low; at the
same time, this implies that Japan is acting as
a major engine for world economic growth,
particularly for Asia-Pacific.4'
Table 1 Trend ofJapan's Balance of Payments
Bal Curnt BC / GDP Per
G&S Acnt capita
mfg imp.
1989　　　5.912　　8.654　　　2.164　　　118
1990　　　3.864　　6.474　　1.505　　　138
1991　　7.292　　9.176　　1.999　　　131
1992　　10.205　14.234　　　3.017　　　119
1993　10.702　14.670　　　3.086　　　112
1994　　　9.834　13.342　　　2.785　　　124
1995　　　6.955　10.387　　　2.159　　　148
1996　　　4.836　　7.493　　1.512　　　　170
3) It was not a coincidence that the backward movement of the exchange rate occurred when Mr. Sakakibara was appointed to
the chief of International Finance Bureau of MOF. He really worked to obtain agreement that the US side would not wish
the weak dollar against yen, and that the over-appreciated yen rate would give no benefit to either side.
Japan's external balance surplus is steadily shrinking, and the bilateral trade surplus against the US is shrinking even more (see
Chart). However, this does not imply that the US trade deficit equally shrink; it is on an expanding trend instead. The reason
is that other Asian exporters, notably China, are expanding their trade surplus.
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V. Long-run Trend of the Yen Rate
First I should like to present a chart of PPP
and market rate of yen/dollar rate. PPP
study is continuously conducted by our govern-
ment (Economic Planning Agency) and the
differential between PPP rate and the market
rate is regularly published by EPA in its annual
report titled "Price Report" as a measure of
'internal/ external price differentiatials". In
Japan, this differential is a political issue. A
wide differential between the two rates show
that Japan's domestic price as measured by the
market rate is significantly higher than over-
seas price. Typically, large differential shows
up in the prices of such categories as food, en-
ergy, transportation, and rent (see Table 1).
One of the major factors that produce this large
Table 2　Gap between PPP and Market Rate
New York London
Overall　　　　1.52　　1.50
Food 1.75　　2.01
Durable 1.41　1. 14
Clothingand 1.76　1.70
Footwear
Energy
Water
Transportation
Telec ommum -
cation
Medicare
Educati on
Rent
General Svc
??????????????????
????? ?????????????
??
???????? ????????? ?????????????? ???
???????
???
????????????? ?? ????????ー??? ???????????????????
Source : Price Report
by EPA, Tokyo, 1994
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differential is the tax scheme that imposes'a
heavy tax on energy( particularly oil) ; another
factor is extraordinarily low productivity in the
domesti  (non-tradable) industrial sectors such
as agriculture and distributive. To narrow the
gap, we need a powerful administrative reform
that encourages more competition in these
hi herto protected sectors. But, as is well rec-
ogmzed also m Korea, these domestic sectors
have been unde  protection for long, and re-
form means a destruction of status quo5'
A Simple Econometrics on the Long-run Trend
of Yen/dollar Rate
Market exchang  rate diverts from PPP.
But, when we look at a long-run series of the
yen-rate,we realize that the rate really re-
gres s on a basic factor, that is, the relative re-
lation between Japanese and American CPI
(see Chart 1). The second explanatory vari-
able is the ratio of net exports (goods and serv-
ice) over current GDP. It explains a medium-
term change of exchange rate, with relatively
large unexplained error terms in the two
subperiods of 1978-81 and 1983-85'
Medium-term adjustment with respect to the
balance of payments imbalance tend to be off-
setting in the long-run, and the long-run factors
remain. One of them is the relative price of
petroleum. The relative CPI between Japan
and the US seems to be determined by another
long-run factor, that is, a complex mixture of
productivity trend, attitude toward inflation
taken by the monetary authority and the gen-
eral public. A regression of the relative CPI
5) Administrative reform was a campaign issue in the latest General Election. LDP led by Prime Minister Hashimoto was said
to be most precautionary about the issue. It is natural since LDP rides on the great coalition of business, large and small, and
farmers and shopkeepers.
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on time trend and the money supply of the US
(in a log-linear format) shows a perfect fit (see
Chart3). On the other hand,Japan's CPI is
heavily dependent on the relative price oil and
a complex mixture of productivity trend and
other structural elements( see Chart 4).
These regression tests lead us to a small re-
cursive model of long-run yen-rate. The fol-
lowing is a table of forecast yen/dollar rate on
the three different sets of assumptions on the
future trend of USM3 (3% or 2% growth) and
the rate of oil price increase (3% or 5%) start-
ing from1996". The case1assumes USM3
keeps expanding at an annual rate of 3% and
oil price at 3%,a modest rate. Case2deals
with5% increase of oil price which the US
money supply expands at 3%. Case3com-
pares with case 1 with a lower rate of monetary
expansion in the US, that is, 2% versus 3%.
The case 1 gives a frame of reference for dis-
cussing the long-run future trend of
yen/dollar rate. We forecast basically a
moderate appreciation of the yen over dollar on
the condition that the relative CPI between the
two countries will maintain a higher inflation
rate on the US side. As long as the yen rate
maintains this steady path against the dollar,
the present pace of fast growth of manufac-
tured goods import will continue. By the end
of this century, Japan's balance of trade of
goods and service will come close to equilib-
rium.
Changed market structure of Japan will
show an import market that is responsive to
es in exchane rate. This will contribute
to the stability of yen; I should like to point out
that the era of violent fluctuation of
yen/dollar rate is over. And PPP will keep
coming closer to the market rate in the future,
probably around 120yen/dol range. Differ-
ential between PPP and the market rate will re-
main in the range of 1.2to 1.4. Total eradica-
tion of the differential will be impossible. A
difference in taxation scheme will remain;
natural and geographical characteristics will
prevent high efficiency in transportation and
distribution in Japan. High land price, even
though it is mitigated by liberalization of agri-
cultural trade and decentralization of business
and political power, will prevail.
Finally I should like to touch upon the future
trend of household saving and saving-
investment balance of Japan. Some say that
the fast rate of aging society of Japan will bring
about a lower personal saving rate, but the fol-
lowing two factors may cause a reverse direc-
tion of personal saving rate; 1) although aging
speed is fast,Japan's today's average age of
population is well below the Western societies,
and there is a solid ground for us to anticipate
that older households are saving significantly.
A high age-profile of wage and substantial
amount of retirement bonus will be a source of
high saving. 2) As a result of drop in the ratio
financial asset over personal disposable income,
there is a good reason why one should expect a
temporary rise in personal saving rate since
household should plan to make up for the loss
inflicted by the bubble-burst in the past years.
If th s seculation is correct, Ja
6) The first subperiod corresponds to the time of the second Oil Shock and the second subperiod to the time of the strong US Dol-
lar of Mr. Raegan.
7) A constant adjustment is conducted to the two equations ofJapan's CPI and EXRCY in order to take into account of 1) present
structural change in CPI movement (the so-called "price destruction" process) and an unusual jump of yen/dollar rate in 1 995.
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see a revival of excess supply of saving that
could lead to a rising external balance accumu-
lation.　However,the future movement of
capital outflow will be different; it has been led
by massive FDI by corporate firms until re-
cently. The pace ofFDI outfloふis likely to be
slower since firms began to realize that the pre-
sent exchange rate of llOto 115 is going to pre-
vail and will make it profitable to invest and to
produce at home, not abroad.
This time,we will see a change;the worst
performance of pension funds and other trust
fund in the past is going to bring about a mas-
sive outflow of resources abroad, as the market
of fund management will be fully liberalized in
the near future. The change in capital account
will be a factor that might contribute to depre-
ciation of the yen rate in the future.
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Table2　Exchange Rate Up to Year2000
EXR-1
1994　102.21
1995　　94.06
1996　106.43
1997　105.38
1998　101.85
1999　　98.02
2000　　94.20
USM3
EXR-2　　EXR- 3
102.21　　102.21
94.06　　　94.06
106.43　　106.57
105.76　　105.67
102.67　　102.30
99.27　　　98.60
95.87　　　94.94
3%　　3%　　2%
Oil Pr c 　　3%　　5%　　3%
USM3-Rate of expansion of M3 in the US
Oil Price -Rate of Increase in S per barrel
A Small Long-run Model of Yen/ Dollar Rate
1-a) EXR - -55.6 + 2.968'RPJPUS - ll.22'BPGSC-1)
(0.88) (4.75)　　　　　　　(1.90)
RR-.7524　s-30.7　DW-.679
0bservation period: 1976-1995
l-b)EXR - -98.9 + 2.608'RPJPUS + 1.0665'OILPR(-1)
(3.34) (7.01)　　　　　　　(5.69)
RR-.8965　s-19.83　DW-1.965
0bservation period: 1976-1995
Relative CPI between Japan and USA
2) Log(RPJPUS) - 5.445 -.01722'Time-.07794ホLog(USM3)
(25.8) (9.60)　　(2.52)
RR-.9896　s-.OI DW-1.137　Observationperiod: 1980-1995
Japan s CPI over Long-term Factors
3) Log(CPI) - 3.902 +.02203'Time +.03856ネLog(POILR(-1)
(70.3)　　　(19.1)　　(4.76)
RR-9869　s-.OI DW-1.750
